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Hart: Feist Test

FROM FACTS TO FORM:
EXTENSION AND APPLICATION
OF THE FEIST "PRACTICAL
INEVITABILITY" TEST AND
CREATIVITY STANDARD
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Note will analyze the results of extending the "practical inevitability" test and creativity standard in the holding of
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 1 from
works involving the compilation of facts to other works including computer programs, sculpture, signs, fabric patterns and
chinaware patterns. It will also discuss the Copyright Office's
review of copyright applications for functional objects. The
Note will continue with an analysis of the ramifications of
the policy of judicial deference to the Register of Copyright's
decision on creativity when reviewing a copyright denial. It will
conclude with a discussion of the judicial policy that an action
for infringement is the most appropriate place to determine the
creativity element necessary for obtaining a copyright for
functional objects.
II.

THE BASIS OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTIONS

The right of an author under the common law to have the
sole right of initial printing and publishing of his or her work
was decided in England by Lord· Mansfield writing for the
majority in Millar v. Taylor. 2
In the United States, constitutional copyright protection
subsists in originai works of authorship.3 The two requirements for authorship, independent creation and creativity,
arise from the statutory phrase "original works of authorship" which in turn has its basis in the Constitution. 4 In order
1. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
2. 1588-1774 Eng. Rep. 119 (1769), quoted in Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal.,
937 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1991).
3. U.S. CONST. art I, §.8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
4. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 102. See also Feist, 111 S. Ct. 1282;
Store Decor v. Stylex Worldwide Indus., Ltd., 767 F. Supp. 181 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
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to be certified as a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work appropriate for copyright protection, the work must incorporate
some creative authorship in its delineation or form. 6
III. THE "PRACTICAL INEVITABILITY" TEST AND
CREATIVITY STANDARD OF FEIST
The Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service CO.6 addressed the constitutional origins of
copyright and determined a standard of creativity to be applied
to all works. Although the Court could have restricted its
holding to the white pages telephone directory which was the
subject of the dispute, the Court used the opportunity for a thorough discussion of the requirement of creativity in copyrighted
works.
The issue in Feist was whether the white pages listings in
a telephone directory, which compiled an alphabetical listing
of the names of telephone subscribers together with their
addresses and telephone numbers, had the requisite creativity to be afforded copyright protection. 7 The Court held that a
work is "original" and qualifies for copyright protection if the
work is independently created by the author and possesses
some minimal degree of creativity.s Originality for copyright
purposes is constitutionally mandated for all works. 9
The Supreme Court held that the vast majority of works
"make the grade. "10 The requisite level is extremely low, even
a slight amount will suffice. ll However, "originality" does not
require "novelty;" a work may be original even though it is very
similar to other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous,
not the result of copying. 12
5. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1991).
6. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
7. [d. at 1282. Rural Telephone Service was a public utility providing service
to communities in Kansas. Rural was required by Kansas regulations to compile a directory including white and yellow pages. The information was obtained from subscribers when they obtained service. Feist Publications, Inc. was a publishing
company that specialized in area wide telephone directories. When Rural refused to
license its white pages listings to Feist, the information was extracted without consent. Although Feist altered many of Rural's listings, several were identical to listings in Rural's directory. The district court granted summary judgment to Rural in
an infringement suit, which was affirmed on appeal. [d. at 1286.
8. [d. at 1287.
9. [d. at 1288.
10. [d. at 1287.
11. [d.
12. [d.
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Prior to Feist the level of creativity necessary for a showing of copyrightability had been described as "very slight,"
"minimal"13 or "modest."14 The Court in Feist held creativity is
the fundamental copyright principle that mandates the law's
seemingly different treatment of facts and factual compilations. 16 No one may claim originality as to facts because facts
do not owe their origin to authorship. IS
Copyright secures authors the right to their original expression, but stimulates others to create freely upon the ideas and
information conveyed by prior works. 17 Under the "sweat of the
brow theory" copyright was a compensation for the difficult work
that compiling facts required. IS In Feist the Supreme Court
rejected the "sweat of the brow" doctrine because it contradicted basic copyright law principles of "originality" and protection for expressions of facts, not facts themselves. 19
"Originality" and not "sweat of the brow" is the standard of
copyright protection in fact based works such as telephone
directories. 20 Even the choice and organization of facts cannot
be so mechanical or habitual as to require no creativity whatsoever. 21 The white pages listings in Feist's telephone directory
were entirely typica1. 22 The Court described the directory as a
"garden-variety white pages directory, devoid of even the
slightest trace of creativity. "23 However, the penultimate reason for denial was that the Court found the alphabetical
arrangement of the telephone directory not only unoriginal, it
.
was practically ineuitable. 24
A person picking up the white pages to find a telephone
number would not only expect but demand that the listings be
13. West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., 799 F.2d 1219, 1223 (8th Cir.
1986).
14. Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409, 411 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 977 (1971).
15. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1288.
16. [d.
17. [d. at 1290 (citing with approval Harper & Row Publishers v. National
Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 555·57 (1985)).
18. [d.
19. [d.
20. [d. at 1295.
21. [d. at 1296.
22. [d.
23. [d.
24. [d. at 1297.
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in alphabetical order. To list them otherwise would be nonfunctional. The only use for the white pages directory is to
obtain the telephone numbers of known persons. While other
compilations of telephone numbers might be helpful, informational or even entertaining, the practical reason behind
the white pages listings in a phone book is to quickly and efficiently provide telephone numbers ordered by subscriber's
name. To achieve this purpose only an alphabetical listing
works. A non-alphabetical listing system for names would
be time consuming and therefore costly to use. Practical considerations dictate its arrangement.
The Court found that there was no practical alternative to
the arrangement of the uncopyrightable facts in Feist's white
pages directory. Any copyrightable selection or arrangement
having creative expression had necessarily been forced to succumb to the practical alphabetical arrangement, and could
not exist.
The fundamental objective of copyright protection is not to
reward the toil of authors but to promote progress through science and the useful arts. 26 Augmenting on and expanding
through access to the ideas and information of others is
encouraged. 26
In a rapidly developing technological society unfettered
access to all ideas is essential. Copyright protection is functional, not privileging. The benefit flows to society, not individuals. Copyright forces the improvement and creation of
expressions of ideas to cultivate useful arts as well as goods and
serVIces.
This societal benefit is achieved by refusing unlimited
copying of old expressions of ideas. The practical aspects of any
work, including its facts or ideas, are not protected by copyright.
This results in a "practical inevitability" test. If the expression
is dictated by functional or practical concerns it is not copyrightable.
The Feist Court did not make new law but instead reaffirmed basic copyright principles with the "practical
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Accord, Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975), quoted in Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1290.
26. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1290.
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inevitability" test. The test can be ~pplied to any copyright situation and guarantees unlimited access to the practical ideas
and information that a free enterprise society needs. It also
promotes change and growth by restricting copying of original
expressions of ideas and stimulating innovative expansion on
creative thought processes. For authors to achieve copyright
protection they must find different creative expressions of
information and ideas. New is not the same as creative.
IV. RECENT JUDICIAL EXTENSION OF THE FEIST
"PRACTICAL INEVITABILITY" TEST TO OTHER TYPES
OF WORKS
As stated previously, prior to Feist the level of creativity nec-

essary for a copyright had been described as more than some,
but not very much. 27 Because all works are in part non-copyrightable, (the idea of "book" is not copyrightable although the
book is), the standard after Feist is that a work must be devoid
of even the slightest trace of creativity.28 To be copyrighted a
work must have creative selectivity, arrangement, or nonfunctional elements not dictated by "practical inevitability." It
is only when form completely follows function that copyright
cannot be permitted. Functions and facts lack "creativity."
The Feist Court did not limit the general rule it was purporting to lay down to compilations but instead reiterated the
basic standard for originality.29 The method of measuring for
originality may vary but the standard remains the same for
every work of authorship.30 The Feist standard of originality
has now been extended beyond compilations to fabric patterns, sculptures, computer programs and chinaware design.
In Allen-Myland v. International Business Machines, an
action for copyright infringement of a computer program, the
Feist creativity standard and the "practical inevitability" test
were applied. 3! The district court on reconsideration held that
27. See, e.g., West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., 799 F.2d 1219, 1223 (8th
Cir. 1986); Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409, 411 (2d Cir.
1970).
28. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1297.
29. Allen-Myland v. International Business Mach., 770 F. Supp. 1004, 1007
(E.D. Pa. 1991).
30. [d. at 1008.
31. [d. at 1004-06. Allen-Myland had asked for reconsideration of the district
court's earlier decision in Allen-Myland v. International Business Mach., 746 F.
Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1990), in light of the Feist decision. In the first decision the court
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Feist did not disprove specifically of decisions requiring the originality of a multi-element work to be considered as a whole,
especially when the elements are designed to work together. 32
The district court also held that Allen-Myland copied information which was original to IBM programmers and the
computer program was not a factual compilation. 33 Mter finding that the method for measuring originality for a factual
compilation would not apply to the contents of the computer
program, the district court held that the standard for originality
in Feist was mandatory as the Supreme Court reaffirmed
basic copyright law on the meaning of the term. 34 The district
court was free to look for originality anywhere on the computer
tape, not just in its arrangement, selection or coordination. 35
Allen-Myland contended that the computer program,
described as a microcode, lacked originality in part because the
contents of portions of the program were created after the
rest of the microcode. If true, this later material would be
necessarily dictated by the programming choices IBM had
already made. 56 This would prevent copyright of this later
material under the "practical inevitability" test of Feist. The
district court did not agree with Allen-Myland and based its
holding on the evidence presented. The court discredited
Allen-Myland's supporting testimony and held that the IBM
research team did not develop the microcode in pieces but as
one design activity altogetherY The court also held that IBM's
choice among many possibilities of table structure, instruction
arrangement and other information were protected expression under Feist. 58
The Feist "practical inevitability" test and creativity standard were applied to a fabric pattern in Folio Impressions v.
Byer California. 59 The appellate court first determined that the
held Allen-Myland liable for infringing IBM's copyright in its 3090 microcode. In reaching its conclusion, the court did not analyze the contents of the tape containing the
infringed materials in isolation from the rest of the microcode. 1d.
32. AUen-Myland v. International Business Mach., 770 F. Supp. 1004, 1008
(E.n. Pa. 1991).
33.1d.
34. 1d.
35.1d.
36. 1d. at 1011.
37.1d.
38. 1d. at 1012.
39. 937 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991). Folio Impressions Inc. (Folio) imported and sold
fabric to women's clothing manufacturers including a rose design which it later
registered with the Copyright Office. Byer California thereafter obtained a swatch of
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pictorial representation of a rose was copyrighted. 40 Then the
court held that the background on which the copyrighted rose
was placed was not original and was not copyrighted.'l
The arrangement of copyrighted roses against the non- .
copyrighted background was examined for creativity justifying
its own copyright.'2 The court held that because the symmetrical placement of the roses on the background was not
designed to ease manufacture (the Feist "practical inevitability" test) it was an artistic decision. 43 The court determined
that even though the pattern was one of only slight originality and little creative output it was still copyrightable under
Feist."
The Feist "practical inevitability" test and creativity standard were applied to freestanding glass sculptures in Runstadler Studios, Inc. v. MCM Ltd. Partnership,'" an action for
copyright infringement. Defendants sought to show that the
creativity of the copyrighted sculpture "Spiral Motion" was
the fabric and showed it to a designer and asked for a similar design. The Byer's contract designer created its own design, Byer purchased the fabric and sold thousands
of garments using a similar design pattern. Folio obtained an injunction on stipulation with Byer. Following a bench trial the district court held that the background
of the original Folio rose design was non-copyrightable as in the public domain, and
the pattern in which the roses were placed against the background was not original.
The district court held that Folio did have a valid copyright to the rose itself, but concluded that there had been no infringement. The injunction was lifted, judgment
entered and Folio appealed. rd. at 762.
40. rd. at 763. Because Folio had a certificate of copyright registration for the
rose and defendants offered no proof to rebut the attendant presumption of validity,
Folio was entitled to copyright protection for the rose as a matter oflaw. rd.
41. rd. at 763-64. Expert testimony showed that the source of the background
was in the public domain and, contrary to the assertions of Folio, the background could
not have been independently created in one day but must have been photocopied. rd.
42. rd. at 765. The roses in the fabric pattern had been placed in straight lines
and turned so that the roses faced in various directions. The pattern was created by
"clip art," a design process where the designer had photocopied the rose, pasted them
onto a background and photocopied the result. rd. at 764.
43. rd. at 765.
44. rd. The copyright extended only to the arrangement of the Folio rose in
straight lines, not to the idea of arranging roses in straight lines. rd. at 764-65.
45. 768 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Ill. 1991). In 1983 Runstadler Studio Inc. (Runstadler)
produced "Spiral Motion," a SCUlpture composed of 39 clear glass rectangles, overlying each other to produce an arc of 405 degrees. Run stadler was issued a certificate
of copyright registration on ·Spiral Motion" in 1988. MCM Limited Partnership sold
a similar sculpture created in 1986 by a co- defendant composed of 17 glass rectangles
producing an arc of 360 degrees. Runstadler brought suit for copyright infringement
and claims for deceptive trade practices under Illinois law. Following hearings the
district court found that ·Spiral Motion" had been indirectly copied and Runstadler
moved for permanent injunction. [d. at 1294-95.
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insufficient to afford copyright protection which would preclude
their liability for copyright infringement. 48
The district court turned to Feist to note that the creativity required for a valid copyright was extremely low. 47 The
court first held that "Spiral Motion's" shape and dimensions
were made by choice, thereby passing the "practical inevitability" test of Feist. 48 The court then held that "Spiral Motion" possessed the required creativity to qualify as an original work of
authorship because the choice of location, orientation and
dimensions of the glass panes showed far more than the trivial amount of creativity necessary.49
The Feist "practical inevitability" test and creativity standard were applied to a set of plastic signs in Sem-Torq, Inc. v.
K mart Corp.50 Sem-Torq brought an action for infringement
against a competitor and sought to have the signs protected by
copyright as a compilation. 51
The appellate court held that the choice of colors, legends,
phrases and pairings of the individual Sem-Torq signs were
mandated by the functional nature of the signs and not the
result of creativity. 52 The signs did not pass the "practical
inevitability" test of Feist. The court necessarily held that the
individual signs were not copyrightable as devoid of even the
slightest trace of creativity. 53
46. [d. at 1295.
47. [d.
48. [d. at 1295-96.
49. [d. at 1297. The denial of the defendant's copyright by the Copyright Office
as an improper -idea" copyright was successfully used to defend the action as plaintiff could not copyright the -idea" either. Defendant's spiral was found expressive and
visually different from -Spiral Motion" and therefore not an infringement ofplaintifrs
copyright. [d. at 1298-99.
50. 936 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1991). Sem-Torq developed five plastic double-sided
signs to be sold as a -set.· Each had a different legend on each side such as -For Sale"
backed with -For Rent." The legends were selected based on "seasonal, demographic, and geographic" factors. The sign "set" was displayed in a tiered rack, with each
sign in an individual pocket. The Sem- Torq signs were sold separately. Co-defendant
Hy-Ko developed its own double sided signs designed to fit in the existing racks
after learning from K mart of successful test sales of the Sem-Torq signs. Hy-Ko used
twelve preexisting legends and artwork from Hy-Ko signs already sold by Hy-Ko to
K mart. Hy-Ko's -set" consisted of six signs on which were -logically" paired legends
such as -House For Sale" backed with -For Sale by Owner.· Sem-Torq brought Buit
against K mart and Hy-Ko for copyright infringement, and state law claims of unfair
competition, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract. Summary judgment was
granted in favor ofK mart and Hy-Ko. Sem-Torq appealed. 1d. at 852-53.
51. [d. at 854.
52. [d.
53. [d. at 854-55.
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The appellate court then held that because the signs were
sold separately and not as a set, the signs did not constitute an
original work of authorship as a compilation. 54
Each of the above cases reached the determination of copyrightability by first applying the "practical inevitability" test
of Feist followed by the creativity assessment. In each case if
the "practical inevitability" test were passed the constitutionally-mandated level of creativity existed and the non-functional and original portions of the work were copyrightable. We
now turn to a case where the exact opposite result was reached.
The Feist creativity standard and the "practical inevitability"
test were applied by the Copyright Office and the D.C. District
Court to deny a copyright for lack of creativity in Homer Laughlin
China Co., v. Oman. 55 The suit reviewed the Copyright Office's
denial of an application for copyright of a chinaware pattern. 56
Plaintiff filed under the Administrative Procedure Act57
contending that the Copyright Office's refusal to register the
chinaware pattern "Gothic" was improper. 58 The issue before
the district court was whether the United States Register of
Copyrights abused his discretion in denying plaintiff's application to register a claim to copyright in the chinaware design
pattern "Gothic." The district court held that the Register had
not abused his discretion. 59
54. [d. at 855.
55. 1991 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) , 26,772 (D.D.C. July 30, 1991). Plaintiff,
Homer Laughlin, created "Gothic" as a china pattern in early January 1988, which
enjoyed considerable commercial success. On April 15, 1988 plaintiff filed its initial
application for copyright of "Gothic." The Copyright Office rejected the application
because familiar shapes and symbols were not copyrightable nor were simple varia·
tions or combinations of basic geometric designs capable of supporting a copyright registration. [d.
Plaintiff refiled its application on February 13, 1989 and the Copyright Office
again denied it on April 1, 1989 because "[tjhe work you submitted for copyright registration is a useful article ... [andj Congress stated that it did not intend to protect
the designs of useful articles." [d.
On September 29, 1989 plaintiff sought reconsideration but the rejection was
affirmed on January 16, 1990 because "the authorship presented must be considered
in its entirety ... [bjut overall authorship on each of these pieces of china is really a
familiar china ware presentation which constitutes too minimal an amount of original
creative authorship to meet even the low standard of authorship required for a work
to be copyrighted." [d.
The final action refusing to register the copyright came in a letter from the
Register on November I, 1990. [d.
56.1d.
57. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988).
58. Homer Laughlin, 1991 Copyright. L. Rep. (CCH) at 24,508.
59.1d.
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The court determined that in approving "Gothic" for copyright, the question for the Register was whether "Gothic" contained certain levels of creativity and originality.60 The court
held that the Copyright Office's incantation of the regulation
barring registration of familiar designs was a shorthand
method of expressing the conclusion that "Gothic" did not
embody a sufficient degree of creative authorship.61
The district court noted that Feist held the requisite level
of creativity was extremely low, even a slight amount would suffice. 62 Then without further comment or application of the
Feist creativity standard, the district court held that it was not
an abuse of discretion to deny the copyright.6s
The district court's rationale was that the Register's refusal
to copyright the chinaware design pattern "Gothic" was not
final since Homer Laughlin could gain full judicial review of
copyrightability in an infringement action."
V. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REVIEW OF FUNCTIONAL
OBJECTS
Because chinaware is a useful article, we will now examine
the statutory requirements for copyright registration of useful
articles and observe that the "practical inevitability" test had
been statutorily mandated for useful articles long before Feist.
A useful article is one having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. 66 The registration of useful
60. 1d. at 24,507 (citing John Muller &: Co. v. New York Arrows Soccer Team, 802
F.2d 989, 990 (8th Cir. 1986».
61. 1d. at 24,508.
62.1d.
63. 1d. The second reference to creativity was in the third letter, where copyright
was denied because -the authorship presented must be considered in its entirety
... [bjut overall authorship on each of these pieces of china is really a familiar chinaware presentation which constitutes too minimal an amount of original creative
authorship to meet even the low standard of authorship required for a work to be copyrighted." 1d.
64. 1d. Plaintiff had raised three contentions in its argument for reconsideration: first, that the Register had not clearly explained the basis for his refusal to register -Gothic" on the basis of insufficient creative authorship; second, that the
procedures for review of the chinaware pattern were deficient; and third, that the commercial success, expense, human effort, professional skills and expertise of the
designer and artistic recognition qualified -Gothic" for a copyright. 1d. The third argument is the -sweat of the brow" theory thoroughly discredited in Feist.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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articles presents the Copyright Office with one of the most difficult issues arising under the Copyright Act. 66
Congress excluded the design of useful articles from the
realm of copyright except when the design incorporates artistic features that can be identified separately from and are
capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects of
the article. 67 This is the "practical inevitability" test as formulated in Feist, which mandates that this test applies to all
copyrights. 68
It was the intent of Congress that unless the shape of an
automobile, airplane, ladies dress, food processor, or any other
industrial product contains some element that, physically or
conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of the article, the design would not be copyrighted. 69

In OddzOn Products, Inc. v. Oman, a case predating Feist,
the Copyright Office affirmed that elements of an object that
were inextricably interwoven with the utilitarian aspects of the
article could not be taken into account in the creativity assessment when it denied copyright for the "Koosh" ball. 70
The district court on review similarly indicated that it
would have been arbitrary for the Copyright Office to deny registration because the "Koosh" ball's shape approximated a
sphere. 71 The court determined that it was not merely that the
66. OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting
Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of Useful Articles,
37 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y. 339 (1990».
67. [d.

68. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1297.
69. OddzOn, 924 F.2d at 349 (citing H.R. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55, reprint·

ed in 1976 CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5668).
70. [d. at 348. OddzOn plaintiffs had invented the "Koosh- ball which is a
patented, trademarked product formed of hundreds of floppy, wiggly, elastomeric fil·
aments radiating from a core. The Copyright Office refused to register the ball as a
soft sculpture. OddzOn had sought copyright registration for the "Koosh- ball to
block importation ofless expensive knockoffs. [d. at 347-48.
The Copyright Office addressed both the visual character and the "tactility- or
feel of the "Koosh" ball. The examiners regarded the "Koosh- ball's shape as a famil·
iar symbol or design because the ball's filaments, rudiment ally formed a sphere,
and according to the Copyright Office, there was no copyrightable authorship in creating such a familiar shape. The texture of the object was perceived by the examiners as a functional part of the work, and therefore not a foundation for registration.
The examiner held "[w]e cannot register a claim for ... the way a work functions,
because Congress did not authorize protection for the functional aspects of articles.-

[d.
71. [d. at 348.
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"Koosh" ball approximated a sphere, it was also that there was
not enough additional creative work beyond the object's basic
shape to warrant a copyright.72 The "Koosh" ball had only a single basic shape, a sphere. 73 In reviewing the district court's
affirmance of denial of the copyright for the "Koosh" ball, the
D.C. Circuit held that the position of the Copyright Office
was clear and that the visual aspect of the "Koosh" ball (a
single sphere) did not reflect the minimal degree of creativity
required for a copyright.74
However, Feist and all its progeny in infringement cases
would require opposite results in both Oddzon and Homer
Laughlin and grant copyright. The Copyright Office's denial of
copyright after the determination that an object has passed the
"practical inevitability" test conflicts with the Supreme Court's
determination of constitutionally protected creativity entitled to copyright in Feist. The conflict is caused by the standard of review applied by the courts to the denial of copyright
by the Copyright Office for the lack of creativity.
VI.

THE DEFERENTIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW

It is the practice of the Copyright Office to issue copyright
registration under reservation and to resolve doubtful claims
in favor ofregistration. 76 When, after registration, the Register
of Copyrights determines that the applicant has met the legal
and formal requirements, the Copyright Office registers the
claim and issues the applicant a certification of registration
under the seal of the Copyright Office. 76
If the Copyright Office refuses registration, the applicant
may seek immediate judicial review in an action under the
Administrative Procedure Act. 77

The Register is currently given a significant degree of deference, and the Register's decision may be overturned only upon
72. [d.
73. [d. The district court applied the Copyright Act definition of "pictorial,

graphic and sculptural works to the conceptual separability test in Brandir Int'l, Inc.
v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1144 (2d Cir. 1987), and held it was not
an abuse of discretion for the Copyright Office to rank the tactile qualities of the
"Koosh" ball as dependent upon, and inseparable from, the utilitarian features of the
object, and hence not protectable by copyright. [d.
74. [d. at 349.
75. Sem·Torq, Inc. v. K mart Corp., 936 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1991).
76. 17 U.S.C. § 410 (1988).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 701·706 (1988); 17 U.S.C. § 701(d) (1988).
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an abuse of discretion standard. 78 In its determination of
abuse of discretion by the Register in denying a copyright,
the reviewing court looks at the reasons stated in the final
agency decision. 79 The appellate stance in reviewing a refusal
to register is the same as that for the district court, a deferential abuse of discretion standard. 8o
The Copyright Office must explain if or why it was employing a categorical distinction of registrability thresholds for the
contested work and other works. 81 Feist casts this in grave doubt
as the registrability threshold for all works is now the same. A
work that passes the "practical inevitability" test is copyrightable.
If the reviewing court is unable to discern from the final agency action disqualifying the application for registration how the
register was applying the relevant statutory prescriptions the
case must be returned for the requisite rational explanation. 82
It is the position of the D.C. District and D.C. Circuit
Courts that the costs of forcing too fine an analysis and too
extensive an explanation of a denial of registration are not
worth the benefits, particularly when reviewing a question
which has unavoidably subjective aspects such as how much
creativity is sufficient to force the copyright office to register
a proffered work. 83 The Register's determination that a deposited object's visual aspect does not reflect the minimal degree of
creativity required for copyright, adequately explains copyright
denial and will not require reversal under the deferential
abuse of standard of review. 84
It is the current policy of the Copyright Office that familiar symbols or designs are not subject to copyright. 86 However,
78. OddzOn, 924 F.2d at 348.
79. Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The failure
of the district court in Homer Laughlin to restrict its decision to the final refusal letter of the Register may constitute reversible error. See Homer Laughlin China Co. v.
Oman, 1991 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) en 26,772, at 24,508 <D.D.C. July 30,1991).
80. Atari, 888 F.2d at 881.
81. OddzOn, 924 F.2d at 348.
82. Atari, 888 F.2d at 881. See also Fort Bragg Ass'n. of Educators v. F.L.R.A.,
870 F.2d 698, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1989); City of Vernon v. FERC, 845 F.2d 1042, 1046-49
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
83. Atari, 888 F.2d at 887 (Silberman, J., concurring).
84. OddzOn, 924 F.2d at 347-48. In OddzOn, the court tacitly held that the only
suitable forum for determination of conceptual separability (i.e. the "practical
inevitabilityW test) was in an action for copyright infringement. Id. at 347.
85. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1991). In Homer Laughlin, the Copyright Office made two
references to the level of creativity found in plaintiffs china ware pattern. The appli-
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simple shapes when selected or combined in a distinctive manner indicating some ingenuity have been accorded copyright. B6
Notwithstanding the Copyright Office's assertions in Homer
Laughlin to the contrary, unique combinations of standard
shapes may be copyrighted. B7 Copyright is intended to encourage original work. 88 It does not mean that relatively simple
works are not entitled copyright protection. 89 Component
parts neither original to the applicant nor copyrightable may,
in combination, create a separate entity that is both original
and copyrightable. eo
In determining creativity, the Register is generally recognized to possess considerable expertise over such matters as a
result of having to make such determinations on a daily basis,
and such a determination required the exercise of informed
discretion. 91
The Copyright Office is not held to be arbitrary by adhering to the conceptual separability test of the Second Circuit
(now supplanted by the "practical inevitability" test of Feist).92
However, the question of conceptual separability ("practical
inevitability") does not come under the purview of the court
when reviewing the denial of registration of copyrights. 93
Another ground for deference to the Copyright Office's
denial of copyright for lack of creativity is that determination
of copyrightability may be sought in an infringement action. 9•
cation was first denied because familiar shapes are not copyrightable nor are simple
variations or combinations of basic geometric designs capable of supporting a copyright registration. Homer Laughlin, 1991 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) .. 26,772.
86. See, e.g., Soptra Fabrics, Corp. v. Stafford Knitting Mills, Inc., 490 F.2d 1092,
1094 (2d Cir. 1974) (fabric design with strip of crescents with scalloping or ribbons with
rows of semicircles); Concord Fabrics, Inc. v. Marcus Bros. Textile Corp., 409 F.2d 1315,
1316 (2d Cir. 1969) (fabric design of circle within a square within a circle).
87. Runstadler Studios, Inc. v. MCM Ltd. Partnership, 768 F. Supp. 1292, 1295
(1991).
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See Apple Barrel Prod., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 1984). See
also Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 764-65 (2d Cir. 1991).
91. Norris Indus., Inc. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 922
(11th Cir. 1983).
92. OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See also
Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987), for a discussion of this test.
93. OddzOn, 924 F.2d at 349.
94. Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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The determination on review that the Copyright Office's denial
is not an abuse of discretion, does not dictate the outcome if the
same question were brought in a copyright infringement
action. 96
In an infringement action, the court need not defer to an
agency's action or interpretation." However, in at least one
recent decision a district court held that to sustain a suit for
copyright infringement the item must be registered in accordance with the Copyright Act.·?
A district court is not required to accept validity of copyright
registration where the certificate of registration was not made
until five years after first publication of the work. 98 A copyright
certificate remains valid in the absence offraud. 99
In a trademark infringement action, the refusal to admit evidence that a manufacturer attempted but failed to have a design
registered under the Copyright Act is not an abuse of discretion. 100
The position ofthe Copyright Office and the courts that getting a copyright later is just as good as getting one sooner is
untenable. The existence of a valid copyright does have effect
on an infringement action.
In copyright infringement cases, because firsthand evidence of copying often is unobtainable, copying may be inferred
where defendant had access to copyrighted material and the
assertedly infringing work is substantially alike. lol Registration
might have evidentiary impact in an action against an infringer
and would prevent the Register's appearance at the infringement action as a party hostile to the claimant on the issue of
registrability.lo2 Another important aspect of prior copyright
protection is the availability of preliminary injunction to a copyright holder in an infringement action. lOS
95. OddzOn, 924 F.2d at 350.
96. Atari, 888 F.2d at 889 (Silberman, J., concurring).
97. Bauer Lamp Co. v. ShatTer, 941 F.2d 1165, 1171 (11th Cir. 1991).
98. Sem-Torq, Inc. v. K mart Corp., 936 F.2d 851, 853-54 (6th Cir. 1991).
99. Bauer, 941 F.2d at 1171.
100. ld.
101. Store Decor v. Stylex Worldwide Indus., Ltd., 767 F. Supp. 181, 184 (N.D.
Ill. 1991).
102. Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 881.
103. Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1107 (5th Cir. 1991). To obtain a
preliminary injunction in a copyright infringement suit the moving party must show
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A copyright may be valuable outside of its evidentiary presumption in an infringement action. Copyright owners may
request the customs service to seize infringing copies. 104 Another reason is that the advantages, requirements, and protections
of copyright differ from trademark. lo5 The property of a bankruptcy estate encompasses intellectual property, such as interests in copyrights. 106
VII. FEIST MANDATES CHANGE IN THE STANDARD OF
REVIEW OF COPYRIGHT DENIALS
The minimal creativity standard of Feist raises a fundamental problem: Is denial of copyright by the Copyright Office
to functional objects for insufficient creativity after passing the
"practical inevitability" test an abuse of discretion?
In all works, including functional objects, non-copyrightable
elements exist. Prior to Feist the level of creativity necessary
for copyright protection had been described as "very slight,"
"minimal" or "modest." After Feist, a work must be devoid of
even the slightest trace of creativity to be denied copyright. The
courts must apply the "practical inevitability" test. Copyright
can be denied only when form follows function. The method of
measuring for originality may vary but the standard remains
the same for every copyright.
"(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that failure to grant the injunction will result in irreparable injury, (3) the threatened injury
outweighs any damage that the injunction may cause the opposing party, and (4) the
injunction will not disserve the public interest." [d. (quoting Allied Mktg. Group, Inc.
v. CDL Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1989». The evidentiary weight of a
copyright certificate may be compelling in the success on the merits issue. [d.
104. 19 C.F.R. § 133.31 (1991). The procedures to stop importation of articles that
infringe a valid and enforceable United States Patent before the U.S. International
Trade Commission are more cumbersome. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (aXb)(1) (1988). Only copyright claims which have been registered may be recorded with customs for import protection. 19 C.F.R. § 133.31. A classic example of the desirability of this advantage is
found in OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The Copyright
Office refused to register the "Koosh" ball as a soft sculpture. OddzOn had a trademark and a patent on the "Koosh" ball but sought copyright registration to block
importation ofless expensive knockoffs. [d.
105. See Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1238-39 (6th Cir. 1991). The
"trade dress" protected from infringement by the Lanham Trademark Act is the
image and overall appearance ofa product and embodies that arrangement ofidentifying characteristics or decorations connected with a product, whether by packaging or otherwise, intended to make source of product distinguishable from another and
to promote its sale. [d.
106. Inslaw v. United States, 932 F.2d 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Trademark protection accrues with use, while copyright protection begins with registration. Bauer
Lamp CO. V. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165, 1171 (11th Cir. 1991).
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The Supreme Court's adoption in Feist of a "practical
inevitability" test of the threshold which a work must exceed
to achieve copyright as creative necessitates that any functional
object which can meet the current statutory requirements
that its creative visual elements be separable from its utilitarian aspects is ipso facto copyrightable.
A faithful application of the Feist standard would require
certification by the Register of Copyright of all useful articles
that can show visual elements not related to their function. Any
higher standard that Copyright Office requires for useful
objects to attain copyright is directly contrary to the Supreme
Court's holding in Feist that the constitutionally mandated
standard requires protection for any expression beyond "practical inevitability."
The contrary result is achieved by an unjustified deferential standard of review by the D.C. District and Circuit Courts.
The Register's creativity determinations are erroneously held
to require considerable expertise and require the exercise of informed discretion. Because the Feist mandated creativity
standard is so low, experts are not necessary to make the creativity determination and there is no need for the reviewing
court's deference.
If there are visual elements in a functional object's design
not based on practical considerations, copyright is both justified and mandatory. If non-practical visual elements exist
then they are creative. If they are creative then they pass
constitutional muster. It is no longer proper for a reviewing
court to defer to the Register's determination on creativity
after the initial determination that non-practical visual elements exist. Denial of copyright subsequent to this determination is an abuse of discretion.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

The denial of copyright until the instigation of an infringement suit after determining the work meets the "practical inevitability" test is an interference with property,
procedural, and evidentiary rights. The outcome in the succeeding infringement action can only be that the work is creative and entitled to copyright.
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The reviewing courts should strictly adhere to Feist and
overturn as an abuse of discretion all denials of copyright by
the Copyright Office after the determination that elements
which pass the "practical inevitability" test exist.

Joseph P. Hart 101

107. Golden Gate University School of Law, class of 1994.
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